Efficient integration of secure and safety critical industrial wireless sensor networks by Johan Åkerberg et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Efficient integration of secure and safety critical
industrial wireless sensor networks
Johan Åkerberg1*, Mikael Gidlund 1, Tomas Lennvall1, Jonas Neander1 and Mats Björkman2
Abstract
Wireless communication has gained more interest in industrial automation due to flexibility, mobility, and cost
reduction. Wireless systems, in general, require additional and different engineering and maintenance tasks, for
example cryptographic key management. This is an important aspect that needs to be addressed before wireless
systems can be deployed and maintained efficiently in the industry.
In this paper, we take an holistic approach that addresses safety and security regardless of the underlying media. In
our proposed framework we introduce security modules which can be retrofitted to provide end-to-end integrity
and authentication measures by utilizing the black channel concept. With the proposed approach, we can extend
and provide end-to-end security as well as functional safety using existing automation equipment and standards,
such as Profisafe, Profinet IO, and WirelessHART. Furthermore, we improve the WirelessHART standard with periodic
and deterministic downlink transmissions to enable efficient usage of wireless actuators, as well as improving the
performance of functional safety protocols.
1. Introduction
Recently the automation industry has shown a strong
interest in migrating substantial parts of the traditionally
wired industrial infrastructure to wireless technologies to
improve flexibility, scalability, and efficiency, with a sig-
nificant cost reduction. The main concerns about reliabil-
ity, security, integration, along with the lack of device
interoperability, have hampered the deployment rate. To
address these concerns, WirelessHART [1], the first open
and interoperable wireless communication standard
especially designed for real-world industrial applications,
was approved and released in 2007. ISA 100.11a is
becoming a standard for process automation and factory
automation [2]. Many automatic meter reading, auto-
matic metering infrastructure systems are being installed
with ZigBee [3] or various proprietary solutions [4,5].
Even though wireless communications offer many bene-
fits, some wired fieldbuses will still remain within indus-
trial communications. Therefore it is necessary to
integrate these two technologies such that they interope-
rate seamlessly. The main problem to solve before wireless
communication can be used and deployed efficiently is to
develop an efficient and adequate solution for integrating
wireless communication with existing fieldbuses and
emerging field networks while supporting functional safety
and security. This would enable an expansion of the com-
munication effectively into areas where wired communica-
tion has challenges with respect to cost, mobility, or
mechanical wear.
Most of the research work done in the field of wireless
extension to traditional fieldbus communication lack in
giving a complete solution to efficient integration. This
article proposes a complete framework for providing
secure and safe communication in wireless/wired net-
works. On top of that, we present a solution: periodic and
deterministic transmissions from gateway to actuators in a
WirelessHART network, which has never been shown
before.
Related work: Industrial communication has progressed
enormously in the last decade with the replacement of the
traditional one-to-one connections between sensors/actua-
tors and controllers by networked connections. In wired
fieldbus communication, functional safety, security, and
integration have been addressed with respect to Profibus
and Profinet [[6], and the references therein]. In [7],
Dzung et al. present a detailed survey about the security
situation in the automation domain. In [8], Jasperneite and
Feld describe Profinet and the usage in automation, which
serves as a good introduction to the area. In addition, they
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propose two different approaches for tight integration of
Profibus and Interbus using Profinet IO.
Wireless extensions of automation networks and field-
buses have been researched in different forms. Willig et al.
discuss many issues and solutions related to wireless field-
bus systems [9]. In [10], Gungor and Hancke present the
state-of-the-art of industrial wireless sensor networks and
open research issues. In [11], Vitturi et al. present results
from an experimental evaluation using experimental
industrial application layer protocol on wireless systems.
In [12], Ishii presents results on multiple backbone routers
to enhance reliability on wireless systems for industrial
automation. In [13], Miorandi and Vitturi analyzed the
possibilities of implementing Profibus DP on hybrid
wired/wireless networks, based on Ethernet and Bluetooth,
respectively. In [14], Sousa and Ferreira discussed and
described the role of simulation tools in order to validate
wireless extensions of the Profibus protocol. Other related
research work on wireless extensions for traditional Profi-
bus can be found in [15-22].
Recently, WirelessHART has received a lot of attention
in both academia and industrial automation. In [23],
Lennvall et al. presented a performance comparison
between the WirelessHART and ZigBee standards. Their
conclusion was that ZigBee is not suitable for wireless
industrial applications due to poor performance, and
security is optional while in the WirelessHART standard
it is mandatory. Security in industrial wireless sensor net-
works have been heavily discussed and in [24], Raza et al.
presented a security analysis of the WirelessHART proto-
col against well known threats in the wireless media.
WirelessHART has also been considered for control
applications in process automation [25]. In [26], Nixon et
al. presented an approach to meet the control perfor-
mance requirements using a wireless mesh network (e.g.,
WirelessHART). Their main conclusion was that device
and network operation must be synchronized.
Functional safety and communication in open transmis-
sion systems have been laid down in IEC 62280-2 [27],
and Deuter et al. address this in their work with Virtual
Automation Networks (VAN) [28]. In [29], Trikaliotis and
Gnad evaluate different mapping solutions for Wireles-
sHART integration. However, their work has not
considered how to deal with WirelessHART specific func-
tionality, engineering efficiency, or secure and safety-criti-
cal communication. There are ongoing standardization
activities for integrating WirelessHART devices into Profi-
bus/Profinet networks within Profibus International and
wireless cooperation team. However, the main difference
is that we take a holistic approach including safety and
security that is not considered for standardization so far.
Contributions: Our detailed contributions in this paper
can be summarized as follows:
• We propose and demonstrate a framework for
wired and wireless communication addressing both
functional safety and security. The framework is
based on the black channel [30] concept and pro-
vides end-to-end security using security modules
and existing functional safety protocols.
• We demonstrate the proposed framework with a
proof-of-concept implementation using Profisafe,
Profinet IO, and WirelessHART using an industrial
control system. The integration method allows secur-
ity and safety-related configuration to be engineered
and downloaded to the WirelessHART network. This
approach is novel as previous work has not consid-
ered security nor safety.
• We propose a new service called periodic downlink
transmission for WirelessHART, that enables peri-
odic and deterministic transmissions from gateway
to WirelessHART actuators. This service enables the
use of wireless actuators to be part of a control
loop, or actuators with timing constraints. In addi-
tion, the service improves the safety function
response time with a factor of 8, when using Profi-
safe on WirelessHART.
Outline: The reminder of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2 the basics of the most important
technologies used in this paper are introduced. In Section
3 we present a framework for safe and secure communi-
cation. In Section 4 we use the proposed framework, to
realize and evaluate safe and secure communication
using Profinet IO, WirelessHART, and Profisafe. Then,
in Section 6 we propose an improvement for Wireles-
sHART to enable periodic and deterministic data transfer
to actuators, which is of importance for wireless control.
Finally, in Section 7 we conclude the paper.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we will present the basics of the technolo-
gies used in this paper. We start with the industrial
Ethernet protocol Profinet IO, then we present the Wire-
lessHART technology. Finally we introduce the safety
protocol Profisafe.
A. Profinet IO
Profinet IO is one of the Ethernet-based fieldbus proto-
cols from the IEC 61784 standard and is the successor
of Profibus. Profinet IO uses switched 100 Mbit/s net-
works to transmit both real-time and non real-time
data. For non real-time communication, Remote Proce-
dure Calls (RPC) are used on top of UDP/IP. For real-
time data, a dedicated layer is defined on top of Ether-
net. The application layer can either communicate via
RPCs or directly on the real-time channel [31-33].
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The Profinet IO device model assumes one or several
Application Processes (AP) within the device. Figure 1
shows the internal structure of an AP for a modular
field device. The AP is subdivided into as many slots
and subslots as needed to represent the physical I/Os of
the device. The structure of an IO-Device is described
in a General Station Description (GSD) file [34]. By
importing the GSD file into the control system, knowl-
edge is gained regarding the device, for example mod-
ules, submodules, parameters, and data types. With this
information the engineering tools of the control system
can generate the configuration necessary for communi-
cation with the device.
Profinet IO uses virtual local area network (VLAN)
[35] on top of the Ethernet layer to be able to prioritize
real-time frames over non-real-time frames in the
switches. The Profinet IO real-time protocol resides on
top of the VLAN layer. The Profinet IO Payload Data
Unit can carry at most 1412 bytes I/O data including IO
Producer Status (IOPS) and IO Consumer Status (IOCS)
[32]. The upper restriction in I/O length is due to the
fact that a Profinet IO real-time frame must fit into one
Ethernet frame to avoid fragmentation of messages.
B. WirelessHART
WirelessHART is a reliable and secure mesh networking
technology designed for process measurement, control,
and asset management applications. It operates in the 2.4
GHz ISM band, utilizing IEEE 802.15.4 compatible direct
sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) radios, channel hop-
ping, and time division multiple access (TDMA). All
devices are time synchronized and communicate in pre-
scheduled fixed length time-slots. Time slots are grouped
together into superframes which are repeated according to
a specified rate.
WirelessHART is a robust network technology which
provides 99.9% end-to-end reliability in industrial pro-
cess environments [1]. This is achieved through the use
of channel hopping and self-healing capabilities of the
mesh network. When paths deteriorate or become
obstructed the self-healing property of the network
ensures it will repair itself and find alternate paths
around obstructions.
Every WirelessHART network consists of five types of
devices:
(1) A gateway: It connects the control system to the
wireless network.
(2) An access point: Is usually part of the gateway
and acts as the radio interface, and multiple AP’s are
making it possible to communicate on different
channels in parallel.
(3) A network manager: Is normally part of the gate-
way and is responsible for managing the wireless
network.
(4) A security manager: Manages and distributes
security encryption keys, and also holds the list of
devices authorized to join the network.
(5) Field devices: These are devices directly con-
nected to the process (measurement and control), or
equipment (asset monitoring) or adapters which
connects wired HART devices to the wireless net-
work (retrofit).
WirelessHART is a secure and reliable protocol, which
uses the advanced encryption standard (AES) with 128
bit block ciphers. A counter with Cipher block chaining
message authentication code mode (CCM) is used to
encrypt messages and calculate the message integrity
code (MIC). The standard supports end-to-end, per-hop,
and peer-to-peer security. End-to-end security is pro-
vided on the network layer, while the data link layer pro-
vides per-hop security between the two neighboring
devices. Peer-to-peer security is provided for secure one-
to-one sessions between field devices and handhelds dur-
ing configuration. WirelessHART devices need a join key
to join the network securely. The join key can be indivi-
dual, or the same for the complete network. When a
device joins the network for the first time, the join key
needs to be programmed via a local port.
C. Black channel and Profisafe
Most industrial safety protocols for fieldbus communica-
tion are based on the principle of the black channel [36],
using the experience from the railway signaling domain
[27,37]. Safe applications and non-safe applications share
the same standard communication system, the black
channel, at the same time. The safe transmission func-
tion, e.g., the safety layer, comprises all measures to
deterministically discover all possible faults and hazards
that could be infiltrated by the black channel, or to keep
the residual error probability under a certain limit
Figure 1 Profinet IO device model.
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without relying on services provided by the network.
Therefore, the black channel principle limits the certifica-
tion effort to the safe transmission functions, i.e., the
safety nodes and their safety layers, as they do not rely on
the standard transmission system which includes
switches, routers, gateways, transmission protocols,
etc. The principle of the black channel is visualized in
Figure 2. In comparison, a White Channel approach
requires all components, including network components,
involved in the safety function to be subject to safety cer-
tification, and is therefore a less attractive alternative
with respect to cost and life cycle management.
Profisafe [38] is one of four safety protocols described
in the IEC 61784-3 standard [36]. Profisafe, or functional
safety communication profile 3/1 (FSCP 3/1) as it is
referred to in the IEC 61784 standard [38], can be used
with both Profibus and Profinet. Profisafe’s way of safety
communication is based on the principle of the black
channel. Figure 3 illustrates the Profisafe protocol layer,
and Profisafe comprises all measures to deterministically
discover all possible faults and hazards that could be
infiltrated by the black channel, or to keep the residual
error probability under a certain limit [38]. Profisafe is
approved for application on black channels with a bit
error probability up to 10-2 [38]. As illustrated in the fig-
ure, the safety layer is maximum 5 bytes long (Control
Byte, and Cyclic Redundancy Check 2 [CRC2]), where
the CRC2 protects the integrity of process data, as well as
the safety-related configuration (F_Parameters). In addi-
tion, a control/status byte is used to control and super-
vise the safety function. A toggle-bit resides within the
control byte, and is used to synchronize the safety layer,
and indirectly to trigger timeouts in the safety layer. The
virtual consecutive number (VCN) is used to deal with
unintended repetition, incorrect sequence, loss, and
insertion of messages, as well as memory failures within
switches. The VCN is incremented on each edge of the
toggle-bit, and the CRC2 includes the CRC1 and VCN to
reduce the safety layer overhead. For a more thorough
description of Profisafe, see [38-40].
3. Proposed framework for safe and secure
communication
In wired fieldbus communication, most fieldbus protocols
provide a safety protocol that can be used to fulfill func-
tional safety requirements. Wireless technologies mostly
come with a security solution due to the nature of the
open media. However, the security measures and capabil-
ities are technology dependent, ranging from optional
security (ZigBee) to an extensive and mandatory part of
the technology (WirelessHART). Using both wired and
wireless fieldbus technologies to complement each other
cause many new challenges, especially with respect to inte-
gration and maintenance, but also with safety and security
considerations as illustrated in Figure 4. In addition, the
figure illustrates the gap between safety and security with
respect to the media, i.e., no security measures in the
wired segments and no safety measures in the wireless
segments. It is of vital importance to achieve “seamless
integration” of wired and wireless communication, to
increase design, engineering, and maintenance efficiency.
In industrial settings, different technologies will most
probably be deployed even in the future, as it is extremely
difficult to solve all industrial requirements with one stan-
dard/protocol. Therefore, we present a framework to deal
with safety and security in heterogeneous networks, that
hides the technical underlying differences, and provides a
unified approach for safety and security.
In order to address the issues with respect to safety and
security, regardless of the type of media, i.e., wired or wire-
less, we propose a framework based on the principle of the
black channel. The proposed framework uses the principle
of the black channel, where each layer comprises all mea-
sures necessary to fulfill the safety or security requirements,
Figure 2 The black channel principle, where safety-related and
non safety-related communication co-exist on the same
standard transmission system (Profinet and WirelessHART). The
black channel is excluded from functional safety certification as the
safe transmission function (Profisafe) comprises all of the measures
to deterministically discover all possible faults and hazards that
could be infiltrated by the black channel.
Figure 3 Illustration of the Profisafe protocol layer.
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without relying on services provided by other layers, thus
reusing existing automation equipment and transmission
protocols. The framework concerns equipment found
within the context of an automation system on the field
network level, i.e., Programmable Logic Controller (PLC),
Distributed Control System (DCS), actuator, sensor, wired
fieldbus, and in addition wireless networks. Figure 5 illus-
trates the proposed method, where a security layer is
added between the communication layer and the applica-
tion layer, using the communication layer as the black
channel. The security layer is not added within the scope
of the Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model),
but rather between the OSI model and the application to
avoid conflicts with standards and to allow end-to-end
security. In the same manner the safety layer is used
between the communication layer, or security layer
depending of the usage of the security layer. For safety cer-
tification reasons, the security layer is part of the safety
layer’s black channel. Within the proposed framework,
safety and security layers can be utilized independent of
each other and are deployed based on the current require-
ments. This approach enables end-to-end security as well
as safety, without adding any safety or security require-
ments on the transmission media. Furthermore, our
approach suits both modular field devices such as distribu-
ted I/O’s and compact devices such as field instrumenta-
tion. Within a modular device, the safety/security layers are
deployed, using the device access point and backplane
buses as a black channel. In the case of a modular I/O,
both safe, secure, and traditional I/O modules can co-exist
independent of the safety/security layers. Our approach
enables a broad range of applications where safety/security
enabled devices can co-exist with already existing field
devices. With our approach, the safety layer and security
layer can be used independently and be deployed according
to the specific requirements. Furthermore, the safety and/
or security layer can be deployed on node-to-node basis,
and co-exist on the same hybrid transmission system for
full flexibility.
As in the case of safety protocols, our approach adds
more or less redundancy in certain layers depending on
the functionality provided by the black channel. The
advantage of our proposed framework is that the underly-
ing technologies and standards belonging to the black
channel do not have to provide specific functionality, as
the upper layers do not rely on them. To exemplify, if a
security layer is added, there will in some cases be a
redundancy in the wireless segment, but the wired seg-
ment will be protected. The trade-off for end-to-end
security could be partially overlapping security measures.
However, end-to-end security is achieved even if there is
partial security in a subsystem. Nevertheless, a certain
degree of redundancy with respect to security is desired.
For example, security measures in the wireless segments
need a secure mechanism for joining the network for
authorized access. Secondly, a common term in the con-
text of security is defense-in-depth, i.e., several layers of
security mechanisms are deployed to make it more diffi-
cult to bypass the security measures. Therefore, redun-
dancy with respect to security, or in other words, defense-
in-depth, has advantages. In summary, our proposed
Figure 4 The upper part of the figure illustrates the current
situation, where security is generally only considered in
wireless communication and safety is considered in wired
communication. The lower part illustrates the desired situation
provided by the proposed framework, where safety and security are
considered regardless of communication media.
Figure 5 The figure illustrates the proposed framework for
safe and secure communication, where the Security Layer
treats the Fieldbus Layer as a black channel, and Safety Layer
treats the Security and Fieldbus Layer as a black channel.
Security and/or Safety can be added depending on the actual
requirements and needs.
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framework is based on the black channel and provides a
general solution for end-to-end security and safety in
wired/wireless networks and is transparent to the underly-
ing transmission media.
4. Seamless integration of safe and secure wired/
wireless communication
In this section we demonstrate our proposed framework
using existing automation equipment and standards,
addressing safety and security, using Profinet IO, Profisafe,
and WirelessHART. In order to retrofit security in Profi-
net IO we introduce a concept called security modules
[41]. In this work, we have chosen the aforementioned
technologies, but other technologies can also be used,
since our proposed framework is technology independent.
Different technologies (ISA100.11a, IEEE 802.15.4) will
most likely achieve a different level of integration, engi-
neering efficiency, and run-time performance, but still
achieve safe and secure end-to-end communication.
It is not sufficient today in the industry only to pro-
vide gateway (GW) functionality, since that introduces a
set of challenges for the end-users during the complete
life-cycle. When new technologies are introduced, either
as replacement or as a complement to existing technolo-
gies, it is expected that the new technologies and solu-
tions are equivalent to or better than existing
technologies and solutions. Therefore we start by pre-
senting an integration method, which allows seamless
integration of WirelessHART in automation systems
using Profinet IO.
A. Communication model
From the Profinet IO device model, illustrated in Figure
1, it can be seen that a subslot (instance of a submo-
dule) allows for example both IO Data and Record Data,
where the former is used to transport process values
from and to the devices, and the latter to transport
device configuration data. It is also possible for subslots
to transfer diagnostic data, such as process or device
alarms. Hence, the concept of subslots (submodules) is
central in modeling Profinet IO devices. The concept of
a slot (instance of a module), will be treated as a con-
tainer grouping subslots into physical or logical units.
Due to the unique properties of a subslot, we model
physical WirelessHART devices as modules, and Wire-
lessHART functionality as submodules. The main
advantage with this approach is that we can separate
functionality from a device. Thus we can model the
WirelessHART functionality as submodules, such as
HART commands, independent of a specific device.
Then the devices are modeled as modules, independent
of their capabilities, and we assign the capabilities (sub-
modules) that are supported by that device (module).
Secondly, our approach allows parametrization,
diagnostics, and process data for each WirelessHART
function which is illustrated in Figure 6.
Furthermore, we model the network manager as one
module with two different submodules. The Network ID
submodule only contains Record Data (configuration
data) to allow the DCS to download the Network ID to
a specific network manager. The second submodule
holds the configuration data of the Join Key to be used
by the network manager in the joining phase of Wireles-
sHART devices. Additional functionality that needs to
be remotely configured by the DCS can be modeled and
extended in the same manner. In this way, we can engi-
neer and distribute configuration data to the network
managers from a central location, using existing engi-
neering tools. The second module in Figure 6, Field
Device, contains three different submodules. The first
submodule has only configuration data containing the
Tag Name of the WirelessHART device which is used
by the gateway to automatically map a specific Profinet
IO slot/subslot to the corresponding WirelessHART
device. As illustrated in Figure 7, the gateway resolves
the addresses of the WirelessHART devices by querying
the devices for their Tag Name and maps them into
slots using the actual Tag Name stored in the subslots.
The last submodules represent different HART Com-
mands that have IO Data and Record Data, i.e. burst
rate, burst mode, burst message, and safety related con-
figuration, that the DCS will download to the Wireles-
sHART device. In this way, all WirelessHART devices
Figure 6 WirelessHART physical or logical devices are modeled
as modules, and the module indicates the communication
status of the device. WirelessHART functionality is modeled as
submodules, which can communicate configuration data (Record
Data Items) and/or process values (IO Data). The submodules can
also indicate their status for additional status information.
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and HART Commands can be modeled, and most
important be configured and maintained in a central
engineering system.
The main advantage of our proposed integration
method is that the already existing engineering tools in
the DCS can be used to engineer and maintain the Wir-
elessHART networks at a central location, in the same
way as existing field devices. In addition, engineering
and maintenance of the WirelessHART devices is sim-
plified, as the configuration will be automatically down-
loaded after replacement of faulty components, thus
reducing the down time. Moreover, the separation of
HART commands, physical and logical units in the
model simplifies both the design of the gateway and
most important the usage of the gateway when consid-
ering safety and security. Other existing integration
work or methods can be used as well, but will most
probably not be beneficial to use with respect to safety,
end-to-end security, as well as engineering and mainte-
nance efforts of the latter.




OFDT if i = s (sensor F Device)
F WD Timesensor +WCDTF Host + TcyF Host if i = sb (sensor bus)
OFDT +WCDTF Host if i = h ( F Host)
F WD Timeactuator +WCDTF Device +DAT if i = ab (actuator bus)
OFDT if i = a (actuator F Device)
(1)
To reduce the possibility that cryptographic keys are
compromised, they should ideally be distributed once.
In addition, the cryptographic keys should be updated
on a regular basis to avoid that the keys are identified
from the ciphertext (Figure 8).
Our solution transmits the keys on-demand in plain
text from the engineering station to the WirelessHART
gateway, by using the Discovery and Configuration Pro-
tocol (DCP) provided by Profinet IO. The keys are pro-
grammed in non-volatile memory in the WirelessHART
gateway by using write-only Manufacturer Specific
Parameters, and are distributed by the WirelessHART
gateway in ciphertext to the WirelessHART devices.
Doing it in this way, the cryptographic keys are assigned
in the same way, using the same engineering tool, as IP-
addresses for Profinet IO field devices without any
changes in the Profinet IO standard. security modules
use the same concept [41], and this enables a simple key
distribution mechanism for Profinet IO and Wireles-
sHART. Distribution of security-relevant data should in
general be transmitted with additional protection com-
pared to for example IP-addresses. However, this addi-
tional protection, e.g., encryption, needs major changes
in the Profinet IO standard and has therefore neither
been further investigated nor implemented. This
approach supports the process of automatic key updates,
by replacing the manual process with an automatic ser-
vice that updates the keys on a regular basis. The join
key and the Network ID of the WirelessHART Device
must initially be configured via some local port for
security reasons; otherwise the WirelessHART Device
cannot join the network and create a secure channel for
key updates. Key distribution is mostly the weakest link,
even in this case, and is a general and known problem
within the area of automation. Our proposed solution is
to be treated as an intermediate solution for key distri-
bution until a proper standard suiting the needs of auto-
mation is developed. Nevertheless, our proposed
solution bridges an important gap towards security for
automation equipment at field level.
C. Communication with security modules
Security for industrial field networks is also important
when deploying a defense-in-depth strategy. security
modules [41] is a concept that makes it possible to ret-
rofit a security layer on top of Profinet IO, without
changing the underlying transmission system or stan-
dards. By using security modules on top of Profinet IO,
end-to-end network security can be achieved and ensure
Figure 7 The WirelessHART gateway queries the network
manager for a list of active WirelessHART devices. Using the list
of active devices from the network manager, the gateway queries
the active devices for their tag names. Now the gateway can map
the device network address to a Profinet IO slot.
Figure 8 An example where security modules protect the
integrity and authentication of the process data transmitted
on Profinet IO.
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authentication, integrity and confidentiality for real-time
communication. security modules are modeled in the
GSD file in addition to the already existing modules. In
this way, depending on the actual security risk assess-
ment, security modules or standard modules can be
instantiated and coexist. The security modules extend
the I/O data with a security layer, mainly to protect the
integrity and authentication of the I/O data in Profinet
IO. The cryptographic keys to be used with security
modules are distributed using the same method as
described in Section 4-B. Thus, the concept of security
modules fits nicely together with the WirelessHART
integration using Profinet IO. By combining security
modules with the proposed WirelessHART integration,
we consider security both for wired and wireless fieldbus
communication, using the principle of the black
channel.
D. Safety function response time
One of the most important metrics for safety-critical
applications is the time between a detected error and
the transition to a safe state. In Profisafe, the Safety
Function Response Time (SFRT ) specifies the worst-
case time before a safe state is achieved in the presence
of errors or failures in the safety function [38]. Depend-
ing on the application, the requirements of SFRT range
from milliseconds to seconds. The SFRT for our
approach can be described and derived, using the same
notation as in IEC 61784-3-3, as follows.
The total safety function delay consists of delays from
several entities, i.e., sensor (F_Device), actuator
(F_Device), bus, and DCS (F_Host), which adds up to
the total delay. The delay from each entity i varies
between a best case and a worst case delay time,
denoted as WCDTi. For safety reasons every entity has a
watchdog timer WDTimei which takes necessary actions
to activate the safe state whenever a failure or error
occurs within the entity [38]. The particular equations
for the entities i of WDTimei are shown in (1), where
OFDT is defined as the One Fault Delay Time and
TcyF_Host is the period time of the DCS. The Device
Acknowledgment Time (DAT ), is the time required to
process a new safety PDU based on current process
values when a new VCN is recognized. Finally, the fail-
safe watchdog timeout F_WD_Time for Profisafe is
defined as [38]
F WD Time = 2T cy +DAT +HAT, (2)
where Tcy is the period time for bus transmissions,
and the host acknowledgment time (HAT ) is the time
required to create a new safety PDU with the following
VCN when an acknowledgment from the device is
detected. The F_WD_Time for Profisafe is given in (2)
but since our approach includes WirelessHART we
need to extend (2) as follows
F WD Time = 2T cyPN IO + 2TcyWH+
DAT +HAT +WCDTGW ,
(3)
where TcyP N I O is the period time of Profinet IO, and
TcyW H is the period time of WirelessHART, and finally
WCDTGW is the worst case delay time of the Profinet
IO/WirelessHART gateway.
Given n entities, the SFRT for our proposed approach
can be calculated as follows [38]





(WDTimei − WCDTi), (4)
where
∑n
i=1 WCDTi defines the total worst case delay
time and maxi = 1,2,..., n(WDTimei - WCDTi) adds the
maximum difference between an entity’s watchdog time-
out and worst case delay time. Thus, the SFRT is the
sum of all worst case delays and the largest watchdog
margin to avoid spurious failsafe trips.
5. Implementation and performance evaluation
The proof-of-concept implementation consists of the
automation system 800xA communicating to a Wireles-
sHART gateway using Profinet IO. One WirelessHART
device is connected to the WirelessHART network. The
reason for the minimalistic test setup is to measure the
safety function performance in an controlled environ-
ment, e.g., easier to identify bottlenecks and limiting
parameters. The performance evaluation scenario can
easily be extended to more realistic setups whenever
needed. Several measurements have been performed on
the proof-of-concept implementation with different set-
tings of the burst rate TcyW H of the WirelessHART
device given in (5), i.e., the period time of updates sent
from the WirelessHART device, in order to measure the
total achieved safety function response time. The secur-
ity layer is part of the black channel, and is therefore
not explicitly mentioned in the performance evaluation.
The security evaluation is rather dependent on the cryp-
tographic algorithms used and is not covered in this
paper. However, in addition to the safety-critical data an
additional MIC is transmitted in order to provide end-
to-end authentication and integrity of the packet, which
do not have a significant contribution to the overall
run-time performance.
TcyWH = {500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000} [ms] (5)
The frequency distribution of the period times are
shown in Figure 9. In the upper part of the picture, the
frequency distribution of the time between two consecu-
tive WirelessHART telegrams ΔtWiH A RT sent from the
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WirelessHART device are plotted with the values of
TcyW H given in (5). In the same way, the frequency dis-
tribution of the measurements of the time between two
transitions of the Profisafe toggle bit ΔtProfisafe is plotted
in the lower graphs, with TcyWH as given in (5). The tog-
gle bit is used to synchronize the Profisafe state-
machines, and is therefore also indirectly used for detec-
tion of protocol timeouts [38], thus it serves as a perfor-
mance indicator. By comparing ΔtW I H A RT and
ΔtProfisafe in Figure 9, it is obvious that downstream data
to the device is transmitted on a best-effort basis, while
the upstream data is transmitted on a periodic basis.
Analyzing the frequency distribution of ΔtProfisafe, when
TcyW H ≥ 3000 ms, it can easily be seen that the probabil-
ities are distributed as multiples of TcyW H (Figure 10).
Figure 11 shows the average time between transitions
of the Profisafe toggle bit given TcyW H , tProfisafe,
derived from the measurements. The most obvious
observation is that tProfisafe does ot correspond to TcyW
H . The main reason for this is that WirelessHART does
not provide periodic services from the gateway to the
device. In addition to this, delays due to execution time
in network components, devices, and unsynchronized
tasks in the nodes add further delays. However, those
delays are not visible in the graph until TcyWH ≥ 5 s, as
the downlink transmissions are sent on best-effort basis.
Sending commands from the DCS to the WirelessHART
device and back takes approximately 3.4 ± 1.4 s, derived
from the measurements of the toggle bit when TcyW H
= 500 ms, and is order of magnitudes larger than the
delays caused by network components. In comparison,
sending periodic telegrams from the device to the
Figure 9 The upper graphs show the frequency distribution of the time between consecutive WirelessHART telegrams, ΔtW i H A RT , at
different WirelessHART period times, TcyW H . The lower graphs show the frequency distribution of the time between transitions on the
Profisafe toggle-bit, ΔtProfisafe, at the same WirelessHART period times, TcyW H , as in the upper graphs. The population size for ΔtProfisafe is ≥ 1200
for all TcyW H .
Figure 10 Test setup used for the performance evaluation
using the settings from Table 1 and values ofTcyW H as given
in (5).
Figure 11 The graph shows the average time between
transitions on the Profisafe toggle-bit given TcyW H , tProfisafe.
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network manager takes 500 ± 5.6 ms derived from the
measurements given that TcyW H = 500 ms.
Based on the measurements, the SFRT can be calcu-
lated to 14.5 s using (1), (3), and (4), given the values in
Table 1. A minimum SFRT of 14.5 s is a long time in
automation (with SFRT typically in the range of millise-
conds to seconds depending on the safety application
requirements), and more nodes in the wireless network
will significantly increase the SFRT to an extent where
few application would benefit of wireless safety func-
tions using current standard, e.g. the SFRT is derived
from the application requirements. It should be noticed
that the safety integrity level is achieved with the pro-
posed approach. Instead of more detailed performance
measurements, conducted in a minimalistic setup, we
will analyze how to improve and achieve a deterministic
TcyW H without interfering with the self-healing attri-
butes of WirelessHART. By improving TcyW H we can
shorten the minimum SFRT, thus enabling further
applications without weakening the safety integrity, due
to the principle of the black channel.
6. Periodic downlink transmission in
WirelessHART
Based on the observations from the proof-of-concept
implementation, we extend WirelessHART services in
this section to support deterministic and periodic down-
link transmissions to allow actuators and safety proto-
cols more efficiently.
The WirelessHART standard targets industrial control
system applications, thus we need to include actuators
as a part of WirelessHART, to enable it to be used in
representative industrial applications. Typically actuators
require deterministic communication, thus best-effort
communication is not sufficient in most cases.
A. Distributed control systems and WirelessHART
Traditionally, DCS periodically acquire data from sen-
sors, execute a control application, and finally set the
output values for the actuators. Typical period times for
DCS’s in process automation range from 250ms to 1s;
however both faster (10 ms) and slower (5 s) period
times exist. In the case where the period time is in the
range of 10 ms WirelessHART is not the technology to
be used. In that case, WISA can be used that is designed
for update rates down to 10 ms [22].
The WirelessHART standard defines a method to set
up efficient and periodic data transfer (≥ 250 ms) from a
sensor to the gateway called burst mode. However, there
is no definition for how to initiate efficient and periodic
data transfer in the opposite direction (gateway to actua-
tor), i.e. the standard lacks HART commands to initiate
periodic data transfer to actuators. WirelessHART
allows the use of proprietary methods to add functional-
ity and therefore it is possible to provide efficient data
transfer from the gateway to actuator. Unfortunately,
current gateway/network manager vendors have focused
on efficient data transfer from sensors to the gateway
and therefore there is no support for the needed data
transfer solution in the opposite direction. In fact, initial
experiments point to vendors providing a solution
which is shown in Figure 12. The figure shows a super-
frame which is scheduled with links (time slots), S1, S2,
..., Sn, for acquiring data from the sensors to the control
application, and links, A1, A2, ..., An, for sending data
from the control application to the actuators. As can be
seen in the figure, all sensor data can be acquired within
one superframe cycle, but it takes n superframe cycles to
send data to all the actuators. In the schedule, we can
see that the actuators are forced to share the same out-
going link. Furthermore, the time for the actuator to
receive the data from the gateway triples when the
actuator is one-hop away from the gateway. Our conclu-
sion is that the network manager schedules far too few
slots per cycle for outgoing traffic, so-called best-effort
communication.
Using best-effort communication for distributing set-
points for actuators in industrial control systems is far
from optimal. To achieve good results from a control
perspective, jitter and delays should be reduced as far as
possible. All the set-points for the actuators need to be
distributed back to the devices within the same cycle.
B. Proposed downlink transmission
We propose a novel solution where the WirelessHART
Network Manager can schedule several outgoing slots
(downlink transmission) from the gateway to the devices
within the same cycle.
The proposed solution includes a new WirelessHART
command that the control application can use to
request periodic transmissions to be set up to the actua-
tors (outgoing slots). A new WirelessHART command is
necessary, as existing commands to initiate periodic
transmissions assume that the network manager is the
Table 1 Values used for the calculations of the safety
function response time (SFRT )1.
Variable Value Description
OFDT 6 ms One fault delay time
DAT 6 ms Device acknowledgment time
HAT 6 ms Host acknowledgment time
TcyF_Host 50 ms Period time of DCS
TcyPNIO 128 ms Period time of Profinet IO
TcyWH 3400 ms Period time of WirelessHART
WCDTF_Host 100 ms Worse case delay time of DCS
WCDTGW 50 ms Worse case delay time of GW
1See IEC 61784-3-3 for the definitions of the variables
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data sink. Since the typical period WirelessHART period
is 250 ms - 1 s and a WirelessHART slot is 10 ms one
can easily deduce that the maximum number of succes-
sive slots for an access point ranges from 25 to 100
slots if all nodes have a direct link to the network man-
ager, and use only one channel at a time given the radio
constraints. If a DCS serves as many sensors as actua-
tors, there will only fit 12 incoming slots for sensor
data, and 12 slots for actuator data, given a period time
of 250 ms. This is because we only have 25 slots avail-
able in 250 ms, if all nodes have a direct link to the net-
work manager. The WirelessHART standard
communicate on 15 channels, hence, theoretically, add-
ing 14 access points could increase the number of avail-
able slots 15 times, if the access points are scheduled to
communicate simultaneously on different channels in
parallel. Adding several access points make it possible to
scale up the number of available slots from 375 to 1500,
depending on the assumed period time of 250 ms to 1 s.
The packet in the WirelessHART standard can only
travel one hop per slot. This introduces delays for
devices which are several hops away from the gateway.
Another issue is that a device usually either only can lis-
ten for a packet, or send a packet simultaneously. Relay-
ing other devices’ data will decrease the number of
available slots, and could even increase the minimum
allowed DCS period. Clustering the network is a solu-
tion which could reduce delays by creating simple one-
hop clusters around several gateways, or Access Points
if several are used. However, in order to create good
network clustering proper planning of the architecture
is important.
Assuming that only the period time of WirelessHART
is changed, then ΔSFRT can be calculated using (1), (3),
and (4) as follows:














where SFRT’ is the improved safety function response
time. Under the assumptions
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
TcyWH > TcyPN IO
W CDTF Host > WCDTF Device
TcyF Host > DAT
that are practically sound as the inequalities differ by




(WDTimei − WCDTi) = WDTimesb − WCDTsb,
where W DTimesb and W C DTsb are defined as
watchdog timer and the worst case delay time between
the sensor and DCS, respectively. Therefore (6) can be
expressed of as in (7) using the same notation of indexes
as in (1).
S F RT = (
∑n
i=1
WCDTi +WDTimesb − WCDTsb) − (
∑n
i=1
WCDTi +WDTimesb − WCDTsb)′
= WCDTs +WCDTsb +WCDTh +WCDTab +WCDTa + 2TcyPN IO + 2TcyWH +DAT +HAT
+WCDTGW +HAT +WCDTGW − 2TcyPN IO − 2TcyWH − (WCDTs +WCDT′sb +WCDTh
+WCDT′ab +WCDTa + 2TcyPN IO + 2Tcy′WH +DAT +HAT +WCDTGW − 2Tcy′P N IO − 2Tcy′WH)
= WCDTsb +WCDTab − WCDT′sb − WCDT′ab
= 2(2TcyPN IO + 2TcyWH) − 2(2TcyPN IO + 2Tcy′WH)
= 4(TcyWH − Tcy′WH)
Thus we can significantly improve the SFRT by 4(3400
- 250) = 12600 ms and reach a SFRT of 1.9 s, by imple-
menting the improved WirelessHART functionality, as
proposed in this paper. The proposed method improves
the SFRT by almost a factor 8. In practice the improve-
ment will be much better, since the problem is the
downstream data from the WirelessHART GW to the
WirelessHART device, which takes approximately 3.4 s,
which is used for TcyW H in Table 1. This figure is an
average, as the data is transmitted in a best effort man-
ner and the jitter is very high. Thus the proposed
improvement will not only contribute to the SFRT, but
also minimize nuisance trips, as the jitter will be drama-
tically improved. The improvement in jitter is expected
to be in the same range as shown in the upper graphs
of Figure 9 as downlink slots are allocated in advance.
7. Conclusions
Today the wired fieldbuses are complemented with
wireless devices and are moving towards the use of
wireless infrastructures. Using wireless infrastructures
within automation demands solutions with the same
properties, such as safety and security, which exist today
in the wired case. Today there exists no solution that
Figure 12 An example of WirelessHART cycles.
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considers functional safety for wireless sensor networks
and the wired fieldbuses lack security extensions within
the context of industrial automation. The lack of these
features will become a severe problem since scalable
and modular solutions cannot be provided when inte-
grating new wired/wireless devices into existing automa-
tion systems.
In this paper we have taken an holistic approach to
wireless sensor networks in automation, and propose an
integration framework of wireless sensor networks. Our
proposal is based upon the principle of the black chan-
nel and security modules where safety and security mea-
sures can be deployed and co-exist depending of current
requirements. security modules is a concept where a
security layer, providing measures for end-to-end integ-
rity and authentication that can be retrofitted on exist-
ing automation systems. We demonstrate that the
proposed framework can be applied on a industrial
automation system using Profisafe, Profinet IO, and
WirelessHART.
Our performance measurements clearly indicate that
periodic and deterministic downlink transmissions from
the WirelessHART gateway to the WirelessHART
devices are needed. Therefore, we extend Wireles-
sHART with periodic and deterministic downlink trans-
missions, to deal with this problem. In addition, we also
solve the general problem of using WirelessHART for
control applications, enabling the usage of Wireles-
sHART actuators that require periodic and deterministic
transfer of set-points for successful operation.
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